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of regulatory framework was always feared for having the potential to create a culture of tactical litigation that would be detrimental to takeovers. This article begins by putting self-regulation in its historical context, and then examines the basis of the perceived fear of litigation. It then examines the approach taken at common law to restrict tactical litigation, it analyses the provisions in the Directive designed to prevent tactical litigation, and examines the implementation of those provisions under the CA 2006. The article then highlights a few examples showing the extent to which the Takeover Panel is able to maintain its self-regulation qualities even after the change to statutory-regulation. It then assesses whether the split jurisdiction provided by the Directive is likely to cause regulatory difficulties. In assessing the perceived fear of tactical litigation, this article concludes that it is very unlikely that the Directive, as implemented by the CA 2006, will cause a litigation culture in UK takeovers.
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TAKEOVER REGULATION
The regulation of takeovers in the UK can be traced from the 1960s, and its history is well documented. 4 Since 1968, takeovers have been regulated by the Takeover Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the "Panel"), a regulatory body set up in response to mounting concern about unfair practices in the conduct of takeover offers. 5 These unfair practices were mainly characterised by defensive measures adopted by offeree boards and aimed at frustrating takeover bids. The real losers in these practices were the shareholders, as often shareholders were not consulted or given the opportunity to decide on the bids. The Panel"s function has always been that of ensuring the fair conduct of a takeover bid from the point of view of the shareholders. The principal objective of the Code is to give shareholders a fair opportunity of considering an offer on its merits. The structure of the Panel and the Code is designed to allow the necessary degree of flexibility of application and interpretation of takeover rules. It has rightly been stated that "untrammelled by the procedural and precedential niceties of the courtroom, the Panel responds in a flexible and well-informed fashion to disputes and governs their resolution in "real time"". 6 The importance and meaning of the Panel"
"flexible" approach has been explaining by Amour and Skeel as follows:
" [T] he flexibility of the Panel"s approach means that it is able to adjust its regulatory responses both to the particular parties before it, and to the changing dynamics of business within the City of London. Takeover participants are expected to comply with the "spirit" as well as the letter of the Code, on which they are expected to seek guidance from the Panel. Because they are actively engaged with the parties, the Panel"s Executive are able to tailor the regulatory requirements (outlining compliance conditions or waiving rules, as appropriate) to the circumstances of a particular case. Moreover, the Panel"s Code Committee is charged with regular and proactive updating of the Code"s provisions to reflect changes in the marketplace". Indeed, as discussed below, the provisions of the CA 2006 take a restrictive approach to litigation in takeovers, making it very unlikely that the change from self-regulation to statutory regulation will create a culture of tactical litigation.
C. PERCEIVED FEAR OF TACTICAL LITIGATION
The Code has always operated in a non-legal context, and been hailed as providing "a quicker, cheaper and more flexible method of regulation, which could not be matched by a system based on legal rulings". 13 Indeed, a system of self-regulation has been hailed for having advantages ranging from commanding a greater degree of expertise and technical knowledge in the relevant area to offering low regulatory costs. 14 The fear has always been that a change from self-regulation to statutory-regulation of legislative system, the rules would have to be less strict, so giving less protection to shareholders, or they would be wide-ranging as at present but without the ability to mitigate their potential harshness in appropriate cases". 19 The Panel"s resistance to the Directive has always been due to the fear that "the directive may inadvertently create a system which increases the risk of litigation during a takeover and lacks the general flexibility that the Panel finds essential in its day to day operations". 20 Given that the majority of takeover activities have historically taken place in the UK compared to any other European state, it was vital to the success of the Directive that the UK was persuaded to go along with the need for a Directive.
As such, the way forward was to allow the first official proposal, the draft 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities agreed with the
Panel and rejected the 1996 proposal by recommending that it should not be adopted. 22 But the Commission needed the UK"s involvement for any European measure to work, and the UK also needed some kind of European rules in place to facilitate cross-border takeovers. The way forward was to make compromises, which also had to take account of the interests of other states. Edwards explained the basis for the process of compromises as an acceptance that "any gain by way of harmonisation and improvement in the regulatory systems of other Member States would be outweighed by the risk of damage to United Kingdom system". implementing the Directive would be favourable to the extent that it contained "measures to ensure that the orderly conduct of bids will not be disrupted by tactical Litigation".
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Throughout the resistance period, the Panel had the UK Government on board.
A central plank in the negotiating position taken by the Government on the Directive was to minimise the risks associated with the possible increase in tactical litigation. 30 Article 4.6 provides that the "Directive shall not affect the power which courts may have in a Member State to decline to hear legal proceedings and to decide whether or not such proceedings affect the outcome of a bid. This Directive shall not affect the power of the Member States to determine the legal position concerning the liability of supervisory authorities or concerning litigation between the parties to a bid". Section 961 CA 2006 exempts the Panel and its individual members from liability in damages for anything done (or omitted to be done) in, or in connection with, the discharge or purported discharge of the regulatory functions of the Panel. Panel to retain its self-regulation advantages -makings its own rules, interpreting the rules, applying the rules and enforcing them on its subjects.
C. COMMON LAW APPROACH RESTRICTING LITIGATION
It is difficult to understand the basis of fears of litigation in takeovers, as the UK courts have been at the forefront of discouraging tactical litigation, and have always accepted the Panel"s interpretation of the Code and have only been prepared to intervene in exceptional circumstances, leaving the Panel to be the judge and the jury in takeover matters. In some cases, the courts have resisted intervening in takeovers, to the extent that where an injunction has been sought, "the very moving for an injunction" has in itself been seen as "an action designed to frustrate the making of the bid". 32 In other cases, the courts, in the words of Millett J, have been dismayed at the "regrettable tendency for the contestants in modern takeover battles to try to enlist the aid of the court".
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In his judgment in Datafin, 34 Sir Donaldson MR made it clear:
eyond a peradventure that in the light of the special nature of the panel, its functions, the market in which it is operating, the time scales which are inherent in that market and the need to safeguard the position of third parties, who may be numbered in thousands, all of whom are entitled to continue to trade upon an assumption of the validity of the panel"s rules and decisions, unless and until they are quashed by the court, I should expect the relationship between the panel and the court to be historic rather than contemporaneous. … court to allow contemporary decisions to take their course, considering the complaint and intervening, if at all, later and in retrospect by declaratory orders which would enable the panel not to repeat any error and would relieve individuals of the disciplinary consequences of any erroneous finding of breach of the rules".
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One of the principles derived from the ruling in Datafin is the non-interventionist principle -the relationship between the Panel and the court is to be historic rather than contemporaneous. This principle has two limbs: the courts will not intervene in an ongoing takeover case; and the courts will only give guidance to the Panel as to how a similar case should be dealt with in the future.
Taking the non-interventionist principle into account, there would be zero incentive for a person to bring judicial review challenging Panel"s procedure because it would not help his case. It is very likely that the courts will continue to adopt the Datafin principle post CA 2006. That being the case, judicial review would prove unhelpful to a litigant. What would help a litigant is an injunction or a ruling of the court in relation to an ongoing takeover case. The non-intervention principle does not interfere with an ongoing takeover case but rather makes declaratory ruling designed to advise the Panel on how to deal with future cases. This partly explains why takeover litigation has been rare. However, the non-interventionist principle has never been strictly a legal principle but a practical one. According to Sir Donaldson MR, "when the takeover is in progress the time scales involved are so short and the need of the markets and those dealing in them to be able to rely on the rulings of the panel is so great that contemporary intervention by the court will usually either be impossible or contrary to the public interest".
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It is the impracticability of intervention, given the highly fluid nature of the takeover market, which makes the courts very reluctant to intervene, not a fetter on 35 ibid, 842. Guinness [1989] The CA 2006 provides that:
R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte
(1) The Panel has a statutory mandate to supervise and make rules on takeovers, including similar rules in the Code.
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(2) The Panel"s ruling has binding effect, and the Panel can make directions that must be complied with. The foregoing goes to show that the Panel still maintain its powers of decision-making, and that parties involved in takeovers are accustomed to obeying takeover rules without resorting to lawsuits. It is unlikely that the Panel will find it necessary to apply to the courts for compliance, but it is too early to rule out the possibility of the Panel calling upon the courts to enforce its powers.
F. SPLIT JURISDICTION AND TACTICAL LITIGATION
The Directive provides for split jurisdiction under Article 4(2). The basic rule under Article 4(2) is that a bid will be subject to control by the supervisory authority in the increase. In those situations, Article 4(2)(e) provides that the Panel will supervise "matters relating to the bid procedure" while a supervisor in the state where the company is incorporated supervises "matters relating to company law". This split jurisdiction is common at European Union level, where in banking regulation, supervisory jurisdiction is determined by principles of home-country control and hostcountry control in European law. 53 The question here is whether this split jurisdiction will become a source of litigation.
As it would not be in the interest of other regulators or foreign companies not to cooperate with the Panel, it is unlikely that the split jurisdiction will cause any practical problem. All regulators have a duty to cooperate with one another.
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Nothing in the Directive prevents intervention by the Commission if cooperation between regulators fails. 55 Companies that engage in takeovers in the UK have a vested economic interest that they will not wish to jeopardise by not cooperating with the Panel. Overall, takeovers are but financial transactions, the financial City in the UK is accustomed to listening to the Panel, companies that become subject to the Panel"s jurisdiction, be it that they are registered in other Member States, will either cooperate with the Panel or find that they have to comply reluctantly with City norms.
Moreover, "the sanctions that the Panel can employ in response to non-UK investors that flout its advice are likely to counteract any erosion of the Panel"s authority". 56 To this extent, it is unlikely that the split jurisdiction will cause litigation. To that extent, the fear that the implementation of the Directive would create a culture of tactical litigation remains a myth.
